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SELECTING AN APPROPRIATE DAMAGES EXPERT IN A
PATENT CASE; AN EXAMINATION OF THE CURRENT
STATUS OF DAUBERT
Michael H. King & Steven M. Evans∗

I. INTRODUCTION
A. Importance of Damages in Patent Cases
The determination of damages is a critical part of any patent case.
As a plaintiff, maximizing awarded damages, whether financial or
injunctive, is the ultimate objective of the patent case. As a defendant,
minimizing or preventing any awarded damages is the ultimate
objective.
Multimillion dollar verdicts in patent cases are now the norm and
hundred plus million dollar verdicts are becoming more frequent. A
lawyer who fails to devote sufficient time to this critical component of a
case does the client a disservice.
B. Types of Damages in Patent Cases
There are generally two types of damages in patent cases: lost
profits and a reasonable royalty.1 A patent owner may seek either lost
profits or a reasonable royalty, or a combination of both, as long the
recoveries do not overlap.2 The determination of patent damages
awarded is a question of fact, and numerous damage theories exist
∗
Michael H. King is a senior partner specializing in complex litigation, with an emphasis on
intellectual property at LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae LLP. Steven M. Evans is a litigator
with McGuireWoods LLP specializing in intellectual property; B.S. in Electrical Engineering,
Purdue University; J.D., Indiana University.
1. Minco, Inc. v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 95 F..3d 1109, 1119, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
2. Id. at 1119 (stating that patent “damages awards encompass both lost profits and a
reasonable royalty on that portion of an infringer’s sales not included in the lost profit calculation”).
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within the broad categories of both lost profits and a reasonable royalty
to help answer that question.
C. Background on Daubert
Due to the nature of patents, litigation involving patents typically
involves technical issues having complex damages calculations. In order
to assist the fact finder in determining a proper damages award in a
patent infringement lawsuit based on any applicable damage theory,
expert witnesses are commonly used. The use of damages experts has
come under increasingly close scrutiny, and clarification on the
requirements for admissible expert testimony has become increasingly
important as well.
For nearly seventy years the admissibility of expert scientific
evidence was controlled by the common law rule known as the “general
acceptance test” or the “Frye test,” based on the 1923 District of
Columbia Court of Appeals case of Frye v. United States. 3 Under the
Frye test, for the court to admit the expert testimony, the “thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have
gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.”4
In 1993 the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. held that Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded the Frye test.5 Rule 702 requires that proposed
expert testimony must assist the trier of fact in understanding the
contested issues at trial, and an expert witness may testify only if three
requirements are met: (1) the testimony must be based upon sufficient
facts or data; (2) the testimony must be the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (3) the witness must have applied the principles and
methods reliably to the facts of the case.6
In Daubert the Supreme Court addressed the subject and initially
outlined some general observations.7 While the list was not definitive,
these “general observations” included: (1) whether the proffered theory
or technique can be and has been tested; (2) whether the theory or
technique has been the subject of peer review and publication; (3)
3. William Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585; 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993);
see generally Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (superseded by statute as
recognized in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587).
4. Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
5. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
6. FED. R. EVID. 702.
7. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. The court clarified the considerations federal judges should
use to determine whether scientific testimony is based on valid reasoning and methodology. Id.
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whether the theory or technique has been evaluated in light of the known
or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique has
been generally accepted in the relevant scientific community.8 Daubert
also indicated that Rule 702 imposes on the trial judge some
“gatekeeping” responsibility to ensure these requirements are met before
expert evidence is admitted.9
D. Later Supreme Court Cases Regarding Daubert
In General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Supreme Court held that
“abuse of discretion is the proper standard by which to review a district
court’s decision to admit or exclude scientific [opinion] evidence.” 10
Accordingly, the Court clarified that significant discretion is given to
trial judges in exercising their gatekeeping function under Daubert.
Later, in Kumho Tire, Ltd. v. Carmichael, the Supreme Court
expanded Daubert by holding that a trial judge’s “gatekeeping”
obligation is not limited to testimony based on scientific knowledge, but
also applies to testimony based on technical and other specialized
knowledge.11 The Supreme Court further held that a trial judge may, but
is not required to, consider all four specific Daubert factors (testing, peer
review, error rate, and general acceptance) if doing so will help
determine the testimony’s reliability.12 The Supreme Court stressed the
flexible nature of the reliability test, and emphasized that “Daubert's list
of specific factors neither necessarily nor exclusively applies to all
experts or in every case.”13 Thus, an expert’s personal knowledge and
experiences may also be considered by a judge in determining the
reliability of that expert’s testimony.
The Supreme Court in Weisgram v. Marley confirmed the authority
of an appellate court to direct the entry of judgment as a matter of law
where the district court erroneously admitted expert testimony, and
where insufficient evidence remained to support a jury’s verdict after the
erroneously admitted evidence was excluded.14 Weisgram therefore
makes crystal clear the importance of preparing for a Daubert challenge
to the admissibility of a potential expert’s testimony.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
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Id. at 593-94.
Id. at 589.
Gen. Elec. Co. v. Robert K. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Patrick Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999).
Id.
Id.
Chad Weisgram v. Marley Co., 528 U.S. 440, 457 (2000).
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E. Sample Cases
Every damages expert offered at trial must be prepared for
challenge by the adverse party. Recent cases demonstrate that trial
judges are increasingly vigilant in fulfilling their Daubert responsibility
and that the stakes are high.
Biondo v. City of Chicago involved a lawsuit brought by
firefighters against the city for race discrimination in promotions.15 The
court excluded the plaintiff’s proposed expert witness.16 This witness,
who intended to testify regarding the probabilities of promotion to the
rank of captain and to the rank of battalion chief, was excluded because
his qualifications were inadequate and his testimony was based on
flawed methodology that would have done little to assist the trier of
fact.17 The expert testified he “was assigned basically to calculate losses
for a group of firefighters essentially by estimating how much money
they would have made in the absence of the race standardization of the
1986 exam and comparing that with how much money they made.”18
The expert assumed all the plaintiffs, absent race standardization of the
1986 exam, would have been promoted to lieutenants, and then
calculated their probabilities of becoming captains through the 1992
exam and the probability of their subsequently becoming battalion
chiefs.19
The court ruled the expert’s testimony was flawed because he did
not provide statistics for individual plaintiffs.20
The expert’s
qualifications were held inadequate because his Ph.D. was not in the
relevant area, he never taught statistics, he published no relevant
writings, and he was unfamiliar with several concepts used by the city in
making promotions.21 The court further held the expert’s testimony was
not based on sound methodology because he did not incorporate specific
data regarding each of the plaintiffs.22
Maguire v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. involved an
employee assaulted by a passenger while working as a train conductor.23
15. Biondo v. City of Chicago, No. 88-CV3773, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9816 (N.D. Ill.
2002), vacated, 382 F.3d 680 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 382 F.3d
680 (2004).
16. Biondo, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9816, at *4
17. Id. at *10-14.
18. Id. at *2.
19. Id. at *2-*3.
20. Id. at *9.
21. Id. at *10-*12.
22. Biondo, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9816 at *19.
23. Maguire v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., No. 99-C3240, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5226, at *1
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Plaintiff offered an expert who had expertise in industrial and premises
security.24 The proffered expert had bachelor’s degrees in criminal
justice and sociology, master’s degrees in industrial safety and industrial
security, and technical training from two police academies.25 He had
employment experience as a police officer, as a security specialist, and
as a corporate director of security at a bank.26 The expert had authored a
number of articles relating to industrial security.27 He also had personal
experience controlling large crowds and had consulted as a security
expert in other litigation.28 He lacked experience specifically in the
railroad industry.29
Despite the proffered expert’s security background, the court
refused to admit his testimony because his conclusions were not based
upon “sufficient relevant facts and data, nor were his conclusions the
produce [sic] of reliable principles and methods.”30 The expert testified
in his deposition that the defendant railroad could have prevented the
assault by limiting the number of boarding passengers, training gate
personnel better in safety procedures, deploying more uniform personnel
during boarding, providing warning signs on platforms, providing a
more efficient radio communication system, and providing additional
crowd control measures such as barriers.31 The court held that the expert
“did not describe how the assault would have been deterred by the
presence of cameras, security personnel, or warning signs.”32 The expert
did not explain how his previous experience in crowd control was
reliable in the context of boarding a train.33 Furthermore, the expert did
not review photographs of the scene, he did not visit the same or any
platform at the same time of day the incident occurred, and he read only
portions of the defendant’s security procedures.34
Marsh v. W.R. Grace & Co. involved cancer victims who each had
absorbed picloram, an ingredient in fertilizer.35 The Fourth Circuit
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
24. Id. at *2.
25. Id. at *7.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Maguire, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5226, at *8.
30. Id. at *14-*15.
31. Id. at *10-*11.
32. Id. at *18.
33. Id. at *16.
34. Id. at *15.
35. Marsh v. W.R. Grace & Co., No. 98-1943, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 23587, at *2 (4th Cir.
2003).

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005

5

Akron Law Review, Vol. 38 [2005], Iss. 2, Art. 3
KING-EVANS1.DOC

362

3/7/2005 11:09 AM

AKRON LAW REVIEW

[38:357

found that the plaintiff’s expert failed to use reliable methods and logical
processes to reach his opinion on causation.36 The proffered expert did
not demonstrate that his methods also were used by other experts in the
field.37 The opinion of the plaintiff’s expert that picloram is a
carcinogen was not generally accepted in the field, he failed to provide a
toxic exposure level for picloram, and he failed to provide any testing to
support the assumed levels of exposure to picloram by the plaintiffs.38
In Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell International, a patent infringement
case involving heavy-duty truck transmissions, the court excluded the
proffered testimony of the defense expert regarding infringement and
invalidity.39 At trial, plaintiff challenged the expert’s qualifications,
arguing the expert was not an expert in “breaking torque,” was not an
expert in the ESS system, and was not qualified to discuss the patent in
issue.40 The court concluded that the expert did not have the requisite
education, experience, or knowledge of the subject matter and prior art
to assist the jury on the central issues in the case.41 The court held that
in order to qualify as an expert witness under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, “a proffered witness must possess the necessary knowledge,
skill, training or education, must testify to scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge, and must testify to matters which would assist
the trier of fact.” 42
The court concluded that the concept of “dithering or breaking
torque” was a central issue before the jury. While the expert had worked
with transmissions for almost forty years, he did not know how the ESS
system in issue controlled fuel, broke torque or dithered.43 Since
dithering and torque reversal in a master clutch transmission were
central issues in the case, and the expert lacked the required skill and
formal training to testify about these matters, the court excluded the
expert.44
The case of Mercado v. Ahmed involved a personal injury case
wherein a child was struck by a taxicab and became disabled.45 The

36. Id. at **9.
37. Id. at **14.
38. Id. at **13-14.
39. Eaton Corp. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp. and Meritor, Auto. Inc., C.A. No. 97-421-JJF; 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17054, at 2 & 61 (D. Del. Oct. 10, 2001).
40. Id. at *61-62.
41. Id. at *62.
42. Id.
43. Id. at *63.
44. Id. at *64.
45. Mercado v. Salim Ahmed & Checker Taxi Co., 756 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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mother of the injured child proposed to introduce testimony by an
economist on the monetary value of the pleasure of the plaintiff’s life. 46
The court was faced with the issue of whether the proposed testimony of
an economist on the cash value of the lost pleasure of life, or hedonic
damages, was admissible.47 In its analysis, the court considered whether
such expert testimony should be admitted based on its reliability and
validity. The court explained that reliability is consistency between
multiple expert opinions given similar circumstances. Validity is a
consideration of the accuracy of an opinion, such as whether a bridge
can withstand a hurricane, and it later does.48 The court held that even
though there may be some consensus regarding the value of the lost
pleasure of life, such consistency is no more prevalent among
economists than it is among jurors. As such, even if opinions of the
value of the lost pleasure of life are statistically reliable and valid, such
opinions fail to assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or
determine the fact in issue “in a way more meaningful than would occur
if the jury asked a group of wise courtroom bystanders for their
opinions.”49 Based on this rationale, the court granted defendants’
motion to bar testimony of plaintiff’s expert on the issue of hedonic, or
value of lost pleasure of life, damages.50
Nilssen v. Motorola involved an alleged breach of a non-disclosure
agreement and misappropriation of trade secrets.51 During motions in
limine, Motorola sought to bar testimony by Nilssen’s expert witness,
DePodwin.52
In addition to a reasonable royalty for Nilssen’s
technology, DePodwin also was going to testify that Nilssen should
receive a “partner’s share in the business” based on the “workable
business concept” provided by Nilssen to Motorola.53 Applying
Daubert, the court determined DePodwin’s opinion for a 25% equity in
46 Id. at 1102.
47. Id.
48. Mercado, 756 F. Supp. at 1098. In this discussion, Judge Zagel distinguished between
reliability and validity. Id. If several experts considered a set of facts and came to the same
conclusion, their opinions are reliable; if the opinions can be verified or proven, they are valid. Id.
To illustrate this point, the court provides an example in which engineers offer opinions about a
bridge. Id. If all the engineers believe the bridge will not stand against a hurricane, their opinions
are reliable. Id. If the bridge withstands the hurricane, the engineers’ opinions are reliable, but they
are not valid. Id. If the bridge is destroyed by the hurricane, their opinions are reliable and valid.
Id.
49. Id. at 1103.
50. Id.
51. Nilssen v. Motorola, Inc., No. 00-2049, 1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12882 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
52. Id. at *35.
53. Id. at *39-40.
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Motorola was wholly irrational and a “pie-in-the-sky” projection, rather
than a calculation of what revenues that 25% would have turned out to
generate in real-world terms.54 DePodwin’s did not speak in terms of
either “actual loss” or “unjust enrichment,” and nothing in any case law
supported DePodwin’s “equity-share” theory.55
Even though trial judges are given wide discretion in applying
Daubert, appellate courts are clearly willing to get into the meat of
Daubert issues. In Doris Deputy v. Lehman Brothers, Inc., the Seventh
Circuit reversed and remanded on Daubert grounds.56 The court gave
several reasons, but the most notable was the district court’s error in
applying credibility standards to an admissibility question. The district
court stated that the expert “was less than candid regarding her
testimony” in a prior case, and that the expert “did not adequately
explain inconsistencies in her reasoning process.”57 The appellate court
felt, based on the transcripts, that the trial judge was improperly focusing
on credibility, and not the principles established under Daubert.58
In Tuato v. Brown, the Tenth Circuit reversed because the district
court “failed to perform its gatekeeping function properly because it
conducted an insufficient Daubert hearing.”59 The case involved
fatalities which occurred between trucks colliding at an intersection.60
At the “Daubert hearing,” plaintiffs objected to the qualifications of
defendants’ expert.61 The district court overruled plaintiffs’ objections
because it found they were disputing the credibility of the expert and the
weight of the evidence, which are matters that do not bear on the initial
admissibility of the expert’s testimony under Daubert.62
The cases of Deputy and Tuato demonstrate that a trial judge’s
discretion on the admissibility of expert testimony is based on the
reliability of an expert’s testimony, and not on his or her credibility.
Credibility is a weight issue for the fact finder, and not a gatekeeper
issue. If an appellate court determines that a judge refused to admit
expert testimony based on credibility, not reliability, then the appellate
court may well find that an abuse of discretion has occurred.
The foregoing cases are just a sampling of the increasing scrutiny
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

Id. at *46-47.
Id. at *42.
Doris Deputy v. Lehman Bros., Inc., 345 F.3d 494, 514 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 506.
Id. at 509.
AFA Tuato v. Brown, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 26438, **9 (10th Cir. 2003).
Id. at **3.
Id. at **10.
Id. at **10-11.
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being applied to potential expert witnesses, and the consequences if the
expert does not meet Daubert standards or the trial court fails to
appropriately apply Daubert. Clearly, counsel must make sure that a
potential expert is Daubert qualified. Such a confirmation process
should include putting any potential expert through a thorough Daubert
analysis. The smart and experienced lawyer will know to challenge his
or her own experts and not be satisfied because their conclusions are
what he or she wants to hear. Make sure your expert truly has
background expertise in the relevant specific field. Furthermore, be sure
his or her theories are correctly applied to the narrow issues in your case.
II. SELECTING A DAMAGES EXPERT IN PATENT CASES
A. Determine Theory of Damages
The first step, of course, is to determine which theory of damages a
patentee is going to assert at trial. As mentioned above, there are two
main theories of patent damages: lost profits and a reasonable royalty
rate. Within each of these two broad categories, there are various
approaches.
After a patentee has made a decision as to which damage theory to
assert, a decision can be made about the kind of damages expert or
experts to be used. Likewise, a sampling of potential experts may help
make the decision on which damage theories are most appropriate in the
given circumstances.
B. Necessary Background for Expert
1. Curriculum Vitae
When reviewing an expert’s education and other background, be
sure to confirm that his or her credentials are appropriate for the specific
issues of the case. For example, if the patent involves a plasma display,
determine whether the expert’s background and experience specifically
covers plasma displays, and not simply electronic design. If it does
include plasma displays, determine what type. Is it really the same type
of plasma display involved in the lawsuit?
Furthermore, consider any public recognition of your expert. Has
he or she received any awards, thus providing support for the acceptance
of his or her ideas? Is he or she a member of any relevant organizations,
and what positions has he or she held in those organizations? How
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about any publications: where were they published, how were they
received, and do they directly relate to the subject of the desired
testimony?
2. Expert Witness Experience
Similarly, confirm your expert has practiced in the appropriate
field. Has the expert worked specifically with plasma displays, and for
how long? Are these the same type of plasma displays involved in your
lawsuit?
How much experience does your expert have being an expert? Has
he or she represented both plaintiffs and defendants? How often has his
or her opinion testimony been accepted or denied? What type of
theories does he or she use? Does he or she rely on similar theories and
are such theories generally accepted? Has he or she opined for the same
party multiple times and have his or her arguments been successful?
Have any bias or prejudice issues been raised against your potential
expert in regard to credibility as an expert? Has he or she written
anything that is inconsistent with likely proposed testimony? Is he or
she bringing real expertise or just convenient summary testimony? For
example, if the expert is an accountant, is he or she testifying about
typical historic royalty rates gained from published data, and did the
expert actually participate in all the calculations? If he or she has not
actually participated in the calculations, your expert is at risk of being
excluded.
C. Prepare the Expert for Daubert Challenge
1. The Expert Must Prepare His or Her Own Report and Opinion
Your expert must prepare his or her own written and oral opinion.
While the lawyer may assist with the form or structure, the content of the
opinion must be from the expert. The expert must be prepared for a
detailed and rigorous cross-examination of his or her opinions. Only by
preparing the opinion can your expert withstand an aggressive attack on
the reasoning and concepts applied in the opinion as well as the integrity
of the work. Little is more dynamic than to watch an “expert” collapse
in a courtroom because the expert was not the true author of the written
report.
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2. Challenge the Expert
You must aggressively challenge your own expert for numerous
reasons: (1) to determine the expert’s credibility at trial; (2) to determine
the expert’s style at trial; (3) to determine whether his or her opinion can
withstand rigorous cross-examination; (4) to determine any weaknesses
in his or her background or testimony; and (5) to determine if you are
really comfortable with the testimony of your expert.
D. Research Your Judge
Given the wide discretion and authority of trial judges in
determining the admissibility of expert testimony, some thought should
be given to your judge. A patentee should research the judge overseeing
the case to determine the judge’s history regarding expert testimony.
For example, determine which procedures or analyses the judge has used
in making determinations regarding the admissibility of expert
testimony. Consider when the judge makes such determinations:
motions in limine, pretrial hearings, specific Daubert hearings, voir dire
examinations in the presence or absence of the jury, and objections
during trial are all possibilities.
III. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has established trial judges as the
“gatekeepers” of admissible expert testimony. In keeping with this
critical function, the Supreme Court has made clear the flexibility and
wide discretion trial judges have in their decisions regarding the
admissibility of proffered expert testimony.
Accordingly, based on the critical role of expert witnesses in
asserting damages theories, a party must be sure the testimony of his or
her expert witness is well-grounded and satisfies the correct
requirements. Failure to recognize the critical process of selecting,
preparing and presenting your expert can undermine the heart of your
case.
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